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RADICAL COMPLEMENTARITY 
 
Kevin Jon Heller* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In October 2011, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) authorised the Office of 
the Prosecutor (OTP) to open an investigation into Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010 and 
2001 post-election violence.1 Over the next four months, the PTC issued 
arrest warrants for the deposed President of Côte d’Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo, 
his First Lady, Simone Gbagbo, and Charles Blé Goudé, one of the Gbagbos’ 
closest political allies. Côte d’Ivoire formally surrendered Laurent and Blé 
Goudé to the Court, but later refused to surrender Simone on the ground that 
it intended to prosecute her domestically.2 Simone Gbagbo’s trial began in an 
Abidjan court in December 2014; in March 2015, Gbagbo3 was convicted on 
all counts and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment – double the sentence 
requested by the prosecution.4 
 
At first glance, Simone Gbagbo’s trial in Côte d’Ivoire seems to represent a 
major victory for the principle of complementarity, the idea that ‘the Court 
and States should work in unison – by complementing each other – in 
reaching the Statute's overall goal... to fight against impunity’.5 The ICC 
                                                        
* Professor of Criminal Law, SOAS, University of London. My thanks to 
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1 Warrant of Arrest for Simone Gbagbo, Simone Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/12), 
Pre-Trial Chamber III, 29 Feb. 2012, § 1 (Gbagbo Arrest Warrant). 
2 Decision on Côte d’Ivoire’s challenge to the admissibility of the case against 
Simone Gbagbo, Simone Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/12), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 11 
Dec. 2014, § 3 (Gbagbo Admissibility Decision). 
3 For sake of readability, this article will generally refer to Simone Gbagbo as 
‘Gbagbo’. It will refer to ‘Laurent Gbagbo’ when necessary. 
4 M. Caldwell, ‘Ivorians Divided Over Simone Gbagbo Conviction’, dw.com, 10 
Mar. 2015, available online at http://www.dw.com/en/ivorians-divided-
over-simone-gbagbo-conviction/a-18305986.  
5 Dissenting Opinion of Judge  nita Us acka, Judgment on the appeal of Libya 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 31 May 2013 entitled ‘Decision 
on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi’, Gaddafi and Al-
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announced its intention to prosecute Gbagbo; Côte d’Ivoire asserted its right 
to prosecute her itself; a domestic trial took place; and Gbagbo was 
ultimately given a sentence considerably longer than any sentence the ICC 
has imposed to date.  
 
Looks, however, can be deceiving: whereas the OTP intended to prosecute 
Simone Gbagbo for the crimes against humanity of murder, rape, other 
inhumane acts, and persecution,6 the Ivorian court convicted her for ordinary 
domestic crimes such as disturbing the peace, organising armed gangs, and 
undermining state security.7 The OTP had argued from the beginning of the 
national proceedings that the Ivorian charges against Gbagbo did not make 
her case inadmissible, because they were not based on ‘substantially the 
same conduct’ as its own charges – the test the Appeals Chamber has adopted 
to determine whether national and international prosecutions involve the 
same case, as required by Art. 17(1) of the Rome Statute.8 The Pre-Trial 
Chamber rejected Côte d’Ivoire’s admissibility challenge on precisely that 
ground two weeks before Gbagbo’s trial opened in  bidjan,9 and the Appeals 
Chamber upheld the PTC’s decision two months after Gbagbo was convicted 
and sentenced.10 Côte d’Ivoire is thus currently obligated to surrender 
                                                                                                                                                       
Senussi (ICC-01/11-01/11-547-Anx2), Appeals Chamber, 21 May 2014, § 57 
(Us acka Gaddafi Dissent). 
6 See Gbagbo Arrest Warrant, supra note 1, § 7. 
7 Caldwell, supra note 4. Côte d’Ivoire also charged Gbagbo with economic 
crimes. The precise nature and status of those charges is unclear. See 
generally Public redacted version of ‘Prosecution’s Response to Côte 
d’Ivoire’s Challenge to the admissibility of the case against Simone Gbagbo’, 
Simone Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/12), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 24 June 2014.  
8 See Judgment  on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the decision 
of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled ‘Decision on the Application 
by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case 
Pursuant to  rticle 19(2)(b) of the Statute’, Muthaura, Kenyatta, and Ali (ICC-
01/09-02/11 OA), Appeals Chamber, 30 Aug. 2011, § 39 (Kenyatta Appeals 
Judgment); Judgment  on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the 
decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled ‘Decision on the 
Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the 
Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute’, Ruto, Kosgey, and Sang (ICC-
01/09-01/11 OA), Appeals Chamber, 30 Aug. 2011, § 40 (Ruto Appeals 
Judgment). 
9 See Judgment  on the appeal of Côte d’Ivoire against the decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber I of 11 December 2014 entitled ‘Decision on Côte d’Ivoire’s 
challenge to the admissibility of the case against Simone Gbagbo’, Simone 
Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/12 OA), Appeals Chamber, 27 May 2015, § 14 
(Gbagbo Appeals Judgment). 
10 Ibid., § 2. 
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Gbagbo to the Court,11 although it has given no indication that it intends to do 
so.12 
The admissibility of Simone Gbagbo’s case raises significant questions about 
the ICC’s complementarity jurisprudence.  s is well known,  rt. 17 of the 
Rome Statute requires the Court to defer to a national investigation or 
prosecution of an individual suspected of committing international crimes 
unless ‘the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution’ itself.13 Art. 17 reflects the object and purpose 
of the principle of complementarity, which is ‘to protect sovereign interests 
in the pursuit of justice for crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction’.14 Indeed, 
the Rome Statute would never have been adopted had Art. 17 not treated the 
Court’s right to pre-empt a national proceeding as an ‘exceptional power’15 to 
be used sparingly and only as a last resort.16  
 
                                                        
11 Gbagbo Admissibility Decision, supra note 2, § 80.  
12 On the contrary, it has recently initiated announced that it intends to try 
Simone Gbagbo again – this time ostensibly for crimes against humanity. See 
 .  boa, ‘Former first leady Simone Gbagbo to face trial in Ivory Coast in 
April’, Reuters, 18 Mar. 2016, available online at 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ivorycoast-politics-trial-idUKKCN0WK2CB. 
The precise allegations remain unclear. 
13 Art. 17(1) ICCSt. 
14 S.M.H. Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire: The Catalysing Effect of 
the International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan (Cambridge University 
Press, 2013) at 58; see also M. Benzing, ‘The Complementarity Regime of the 
International Criminal Court: International Criminal Justice Between State 
Sovereignty and the Fight  gainst Impunity’, 7 Max Planck Yearbook of United 
Nations Law (2003) 591-632, at 595 (noting that ‘[t]he most apparent 
underlying interest that the complementarity regime of the Court is designed 
to protect is the sovereignty both of State parties and third states’). 
15 F. Megrét & M.G. Samson, ‘Holding the Line on Complementarity in Libya: 
The Case for Tolerating Flawed Domestic Trials’, 11 
Journal of International Criminal Justice (JICJ) (2013) 571-589, at 578; see 
also M.M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal 
Law: Origin, Development and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) at 306 
(noting that admissibility should exist only in ‘exceptional circumstances’). 
16 P. McAuliffe, ‘From Watchdog to Workhorse: Explaining the Emergence of 
the ICC’s Burden-sharing Policy as an Example of Creeping Cosmopolitanism’, 
13 Chinese Journal of International Law (2014) 259–296, at 273 (‘From the 
earliest stages in the negotiation process, States rejected international 
primacy on the basis that they had a vital interest in remaining responsible 
and accountable for prosecuting violations of their laws’.). 
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Given  rt. 17’s emphasis on state sovereignty, it is important to consider 
whether the Court’s decision in Simone Gbagbo is consistent with the 
principle of complementarity. This Article argues that it is not – that Côte 
d’Ivoire can be considered ‘inactive’ under  rt. 17 only because the ICC’s 
judges have imposed structural limits on national proceedings that are 
inconsistent with the Rome Statute and counterproductive in practice. The 
Article thus defends what we might call ‘radical complementarity’: the idea 
that as long as a state is making a genuine effort to bring a suspect to justice, 
the ICC should find his or her case inadmissible regardless of the conduct the 
state investigates or the prosecutorial strategy the state pursues. 
 
The Article itself is divided into two sections. Section 1 criticises the Court’s 
jurisprudence concerning  rt. 17’s ‘same person’ requirement, arguing that 
the test the judges use to determine whether a state is investigating a 
particular suspect is both inconsistent with the Rome Statute and far too 
restrictive in practice. Section 2 then uses Simone Gbagbo’s case to explain 
why the ‘same conduct’ requirement is antithetical to the goals underlying 
complementarity and should be rejected as a matter of law. 
 
I. THE ‘SAME PERSON’ REQUIREMENT 
 
In the Kenya cases, the Appeals Chamber made clear that no admissibility 
challenge can succeed unless the state is actively investigating the same 
suspect as the OTP: 
 
The words 'is being investigated', in this context, signify 
the taking of steps directed at ascertaining whether 
those suspects are responsible for that conduct, for 
instance by interviewing witnesses or suspects, 
collecting documentary evidence, or carrying out 
forensic analyses. The mere preparedness to take such 
steps or the investigation of other suspects is not 
sufficient. This is because unless investigative steps are 
actually taken in relation to the suspects who are the 
subject of the proceedings before the Court, it cannot be 
said that the same case is (currently) under 
investigation by the Court and by a national 
jurisdiction, and there is therefore no conflict of 
jurisdictions.17 
 
The critical question, of course, is what kinds of national investigative steps 
are required to establish that a state is indeed genuinely investigating the 
suspect targeted by the ICC. The Appeals Chamber has not provided a specific 
                                                        
17 See, e.g., Kenyatta Appeals Judgment, supra note 8, § 40. 
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answer to that question, choosing instead to articulate three general 
principles that govern the inquiry. Two of those principles are addressed to 
states: (1) a state must ‘provide the Court with evidence of a sufficient degree 
of specificity and probative value that demonstrates that it is indeed 
investigating the case’, because ‘it is not sufficient merely to assert that 
investigations are ongoing’18; and (2) evidence of ‘concrete and progressive 
investigative steps’ is required.19 The third principle is then addressed to the 
ICC’s judges, directing them not to adopt a view of the investigation 
requirement that elides the distinction between inactivity and unwillingness: 
 
[D]etermining the existence of an investigation must be 
distinguished from assessing whether the State is 
‘unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution’, which is the second 
question to consider when determining the 
admissibility of a case. For assessing whether the State 
is indeed investigating, the genuineness of the 
investigation is not at issue; what is at issue is whether 
there are investigative steps.20  
 
The  ppeals Chamber’s first and third principles are unobjectionable. Its 
second principle, however, is problematic. To begin with, the Appeals 
Chamber simply invented the requirement that investigative steps must be 
‘progressive’ as well as ‘concrete’.  rt. 17 requires only that ‘[t]he case is 
being investigated’, which suggests that any investigative step involving the 
same suspect will satisfy the investigation requirement. Consideration of an 
investigation’s temporal aspects thus seems more appropriately addressed in 
the Pre-Trial Chamber’s assessment of whether the state is genuinely willing 
to investigate. If a state begins an investigation but does nothing to progress 
it, it would not be unreasonable for the PTC to infer unwillingness. 
 
The  ppeals Chamber’s insistence that a state must both initiate and 
progress an investigation thus does precisely what it told the Pre-Trial 
Chamber not to do: elide the difference between inactivity and unwillingness. 
Indeed, Judge Ušacka made precisely that point in her dissent in the Ruto 
case when she responded to the majority’s ‘demanding definition’ of the 
investigation requirement. In her view, the majority had ‘circumvented’ the 
‘high threshold’ the drafters of the Rome State had established for 
                                                        
18 Ibid., §§ 58-61. 
19 Gbagbo Appeals Judgment, supra note 9, § 81; Kenyatta Appeals Judgment, 
supra note 8, § 81. 
20 Kenyatta Appeals Judgment, supra note 8, § 40. 
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unwillingness by requiring Kenya to prove the existence of ‘a full-fledged 
investigation... in order to establish that there is no situation of inactivity’.21  
 
Judge Ušacka’s criticism represents an accurate assessment of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s insistence that Kenya was inactive regarding the Ocampo Six – a 
conclusion upheld by the Appeals Chamber.22 As she noted in her dissent, 
although Kenya did not claim that its investigations were ‘very advanced’ or 
‘nearly completed’, it did submit evidence that investigations of the Ocampo 
Six were underway at the time of the admissibility challenge.23 With regard 
to Ruto, for example, Kenya’s evidence indicated that a case file had been 
opened and assigned a number; that the case file referred to Ruto as a 
suspect; and that the case file provided information concerning the scope of 
the investigation, including the location and time of Ruto’s alleged criminal 
conduct.24 Similarly, with regard to the other defendants, Kenya’s evidence 
indicated not only that the Attorney General had formally ordered the 
Commissioner of Police to open investigations, but also that criminal 
investigators were locating potential witnesses, reviewing government 
documents and news reports, following up previous investigative leads, 
analysing the actions of lower-level suspects to identify potential cooperating 
witnesses, and visiting various crime scenes.25 The PTC nevertheless 
concluded that Kenya was ‘inactive’ with regard to the Ocampo Six because it 
had failed to submit ‘information about dates when investigations, if any, 
have commenced against the three suspects, and whether the suspects were 
actually questioned or not, and if so, the contents of the police or public 
prosecutions' reports regarding the questioning’26 – considerations that were 
clearly relevant to whether Kenya was genuinely investigating, but went far 
                                                        
21 Dissenting Opinion of Judge  nita Us acka, Judgment  on the appeal of the 
Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 
2011 entitled ‘Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya 
Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the 
Statute’, Ruto, Kosgey, and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11 OA), Appeals Chamber, 20 
Sept. 2011, § 27 (Us acka Ruto Dissent). 
22 Kenyatta Appeals Judgment, supra note 8, § 69. 
23 Us acka Ruto Dissent, supra note 21, § 8. 
24 See ibid. 
25 Document in Support of the ‘ ppeal of the Government of Kenya against 
the Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the 
Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to  rticle 19(2)(b) of the Statute’, 
Muthaura, Kenyatta, and Ali (ICC-01/09-02/11), Appeals Chamber, 20 June 
2011, § 5. 
26 Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the 
Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute, Ruto, 
Kosgey, and Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 30 May 2011, § 
69 (Ruto Admissibility Decision). 
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beyond what was necessary to establish whether Kenya was investigating at 
all.27 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber even more blatantly elided the distinction between 
inactivity and unwillingness in the Simone Gbagbo case. Côte d’Ivoire’s 
uncontested evidence made clear that the state had formally initiated an 
investigation of Gbagbo,28 had detained her, 29 had interrogated her,30 had 
questioned a partie civile about her actions,31 and had attempted to collect 
evidence relevant to her crimes.32 The PTC nevertheless concluded that Côte 
d’Ivoire was inactive regarding her case, because ‘the investigative activities 
undertaken by the domestic authorities are not tangible, concrete and 
progressive, but, on the contrary, sparse and disparate’.33 That conclusion is 
difficult to defend: although the sparseness and dissimilarity of Côte 
d’Ivoire’s investigative activities might have indicated that the state was 
unwilling to investigate Gbagbo34 or convinced the PTC that Côte d’Ivoire 
was not investigating ‘substantially the same conduct’ as the OTP,35 there is 
no question that Côte d’Ivoire was actually investigating Gbagbo’s case. 
Indeed, by the time the Appeals Chamber affirmed the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
decision that Cote d’Ivoire was “inactive” with regard to her case, Gbagbo had 
already been convicted and sentenced – a perverse outcome made possible 
by the  ppeals Chambers’ excessively formalist, and rather guilty, insistence 
that it had to “exclud[e] facts postdating the Impugned Decision from the 
scope of its review.”36 
 
Côte d’Ivoire was fully aware that it had not made substantial progress in the 
investigation at the time of its admissibility challenge. But it did not attribute 
that lack of progress to either unwillingness or inability – much less to 
inactivity. Instead, it pointed out that the state had recently emerged from 
serious conflict and thus lacked the ‘considerable material and human 
                                                        
27 The Pre-Trial Chamber also questioned whether Kenya had submitted 
sufficient evidence to establish that investigations were ongoing. Ibid., § 60. 
 s Judge Ušacka noted in her dissent, however, the Chamber refused to 
permit Kenya to submit additional documentation on that issue. Ušacka Ruto 
Dissent, supra note 21, § 24. 
28 Gbagbo Admissibility Decision, supra note 2, § 65. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., § 73. 
31 Ibid., § 60. 
32 Ibid., § 72. 
33 Ibid., § 65. 
34 The PTC consistently emphasised how slowly the investigation was 
proceeding. See ibid., §§ 68, 69.  
35 Which, of course, the Pre-Trial Chamber also concluded. See ibid., § 78. 
36 Gbagbo Appeals Judgment, supra note 9, § 45. 
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resources’ required to more efficiently investigate a case as complex and 
politically-charged as Simone Gbagbo’s.37 The Pre-Trial Chamber ignored 
that aspect of Côte d’Ivoire’s argument, and the  ppeals Chamber explicitly 
dismissed its relevance to the investigation requirement.38 That cavalier 
dismissal illustrates yet another problem with the Appeals Chamber’s 
interpretation of the investigation requirement: it is inherently biased 
toward states that have not experienced significant conflict and that have 
well-resourced investigative services – i.e., most states in the Global North. 
 s Judge Ušacka pointed out in her Gaddafi dissent, ‘stringent standards’ for 
investigation ‘impose unnecessarily high requirements on States with a legal 
and judicial system in transition and would unduly burden their transitional 
justice efforts’, while ‘states that do not have such difficulties [will] more 
easily meet these high standards’.39 
 
The  ppeals Chamber’s restrictive interpretation of  rt. 17’s ‘same person’ 
requirement also has a significant practical cost: it effectively prohibits a 
state from relying on the kind of ‘pyramidal’ prosecutorial strategy that has 
proven so effective at the ICTY.40 As Carla Del Ponte has noted, although all 
international tribunals are primarily interested in prosecuting those ‘most 
responsible’ for international crimes, ‘[b]uilding a case against the most 
senior persons responsible may involve a series of cases which “work up the 
ladder,” prosecuting lower-level perpetrators in the collection of evidence 
against the higher-level perpetrators, or in obtaining the substantive 
cooperation of insiders’.41 Senior political and military leaders rarely leave 
behind an ‘overt trail’ of evidence that conclusively connects them to 
atrocities42; a pyramidal strategy may thus be the only effective way to build 
a case against such perpetrators. Starting with lower-level suspects may also 
‘provide an opportunity for a court to demonstrate its bona fides in 
conducting impartial trials’ – a critical consideration for many post-conflict 
states.43  
 
Because of these advantages, the Court should avoid finding a state ‘inactive’ 
with regard to high-level suspects targeted by the OTP simply because the 
                                                        
37 See, e.g., ibid., § 120. 
38 Ibid., § 122. 
39 Us acka Gaddafi Dissent, supra note 5, § 62. 
40 C. Del Ponte, ‘Investigation and Prosecution of Large-scale Crimes at the 
International Level: The Experience of the ICTY’, 4 JICJ (2006) 539-558, at 
545. 
41 Ibid. at 543. 
42 Ibid. at 544. 
43  .S. Weiner, ‘Prudent Politics: The International Criminal Court, 
International Relations, and Prosecutorial Independence’, 12 Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review (2013) 545-562, at 556-557. 
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state is pursuing those suspects through a pyramidal investigative strategy. 
After all, the OTP itself recently announced its willingness to adopt that kind 
of strategy: 
 
The required evidentiary standards to prove the 
criminal responsibility of the most responsible might 
force the OTP sometimes to change its approach due to 
limitations on investigative possibilities and/or a lack 
of cooperation. A strategy of gradually building 
upwards might then be needed in which the Office first 
investigates and prosecutes a limited number of mid 
and high-level perpetrators in order to ultimately have 
a reasonable prospect of conviction for the most 
responsible.44 
 
Unfortunately, the  ppeals Chamber’s ‘same person’ jurisprudence makes it 
very unlikely the judges will accept a pyramidal investigative strategy – even 
one specifically designed to build a case against suspects targeted by the 
OTP. Kenya invoked precisely that kind of ‘bottom up’ approach in the Kenya 
cases, arguing that it could not be considered inactive because it had opened 
formal investigations into the Ocampo Six and intended to develop evidence 
against them by ‘building on the investigation and prosecution of lower level 
perpetrators’.45 Both the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber 
rejected Kenya’s argument, bizarrely treating it as an ‘acknowledgment’ by 
Kenya that ‘so far the alleged ongoing investigations have not yet extended to 
those at the highest level of the hierarchy’.46 Neither Chamber explained why 
prosecuting lower-level suspects in order to convince them to testify against 
the Ocampo Six could not be considered the kind of ‘concrete and progressive 
investigative steps’ ostensibly required by  rt. 17.   
 
III. THE ‘SUBSTANTIALLY SAME CONDUCT’ REQUIREMENT 
 
                                                        
44 ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan June 2012-2015 (2013), at 6, 
available online at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20th
e%20prosecutor/reports%20and%20statements/statement/Documents/O
TP%20Strategic%20Plan.pdf. 
45 Application on Behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya 
Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute, Ruto, Kosgey, and Sang & Muthaura, 
Kenyatta, and Ali (ICC-01/09-01/11 and ICC-01/09-02/11), Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, 31 Mar. 2011, § 71 (Kenya Admissibility Challenge). 
46 Ruto Admissibility Decision, supra note 26, § 62; Ruto Appeals Judgment, 
supra note 8, § 83. 
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The  ppeals Chamber applies the ‘substantially same conduct’ requirement 
in two different admissibility contexts: (1) when a state challenges the OTP’s 
decision to open a formal investigation into a situation; and (2) when a state 
or suspect challenges the admissibility of a particular case. In both contexts 
the requirement is profoundly counterproductive. 
 
 
 
 
A. Situations 
 
With regard to situations, the key provision in the Rome Statute is Art. 18, 
which permits states to challenge a decision by the OTP to open an 
investigation.47 When a state challenges the OTP’s decision, the OTP must 
either defer to the national investigation or ask the Pre-Trial Chamber to 
authorise the investigation over the state’s objections. If the OTP pursues the 
latter course, the PTC must consider admissibility when deciding whether 
there is a reasonable basis to authorise the investigation.48 
 
As the Appeals Chamber has acknowledged, assessing admissibility is very 
difficult when a state challenges the OTP’s decision to investigate a situation. 
At that point, the OTP is likely to have no more than a preliminary and 
‘relatively vague’ idea of the specific suspects and specific conduct it intends 
to prosecute.49 The Pre-Trial Chamber has thus adopted a relatively general 
standard for determining whether the state is investigating or prosecuting 
‘substantially the same conduct’ as the ICC: 
 
Accordingly, admissibility at the situation phase should 
be assessed against certain criteria defining a ‘potential 
case’ such as: (i) the groups of persons involved that are 
likely to be the focus of an investigation for the purpose 
of shaping the future case(s); and (ii) the crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed during 
the incidents that are likely to be the focus of an 
investigation for the purpose of shaping the future 
case(s).50   
                                                        
47 Art. 18(2) ICCSt. The provision applies to both proprio motu investigations 
and investigations initiated pursuant to a State or Security Council referral. 
48 Art. 53(2) RPE; see also Kenyatta Appeals Judgment, supra note 8, § 37. 
49 Kenyatta Appeals Judgment, supra note 8, § 38. 
50 Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of 
an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya (ICC-01/09), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 31 Mar. 2010, § 50 
(Kenya Article 15 Decision). 
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Although this approach makes intuitive sense, it creates nearly insuperable 
practical problems for a state that does not want its nationals prosecuted by 
the Court but is still genuinely committed to bringing the perpetrators of 
international crimes to justice. Given the length of most preliminary 
examinations, such a ‘willing’ state will almost certainly begin national 
investigations long before the OTP decides to formally investigate the 
situation. The state will thus be able to forestall a formal OTP investigation 
only by accurately predicting which conduct (‘incidents’) the OTP will target 
if it decides to open an investigation. That is a difficult task at best, given the 
‘universe of criminality’ that characterises situations in which international 
crimes have been committed.51  s Nielsen and Kleffner note, ‘the scale of the 
crimes investigated by international criminal courts’ almost always means 
that the crime base is ‘very large, extending over substantial geographic 
areas and encompassing dozens or even hundreds of individual crime 
scenes’.52 Even accurately predicting the OTP’s primary suspects will be 
difficult in that context: as noted earlier, the OTP has recently announced its 
willingness to prosecute mid-level perpetrators as part of a pyramidal 
strategy directed towards those ‘most responsible’ for international crimes, 
thereby significantly expanding the number of suspects the OTP might target 
in any particular situation. 
 
It is quite likely, then, that a diligent state that begins national investigations 
before the OTP intervenes will not focus on all of the same suspects and all of 
the same conduct as the OTP.53 That state will then face two equally-
unpalatable options. The first will be to simply permit the ICC investigation 
to proceed and wait to challenge the admissibility of specific cases. Few 
states will accept that option, however, because even the mere opening of an 
ICC investigation imposes significant reputational costs on a state.54 The 
second option – and thus the lesser of two evils – will be for the state to 
reconfigure its investigative program to cover the groups of persons and 
general conduct the OTP identifies in its authorisation request. Well-
resourced states may be able to handle such a reconfiguration, even though 
doing so will still waste investigative resources. Less well-resourced states, 
                                                        
51 R. Rastan, ‘What is a ‘Case’ for the Purpose of the Rome Statute?’, 19 
Criminal Law Forum (2008) 435-448, at 439.  
52 M. Nystedt et al., A Handbook on Assisting International Criminal 
Investigations (Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2011) at 42; see also M. Konforta 
& M.M. Vajda, ‘The Principle of Complementarity in the Jurisprudence of the 
ICC’, 3 ZPR 3 (2014) 9-27, at 18 (noting that international crimes ‘normally 
encompass a number of different specific incidents or events, as well as a 
huge number of victims’). 
53 See Konforta & Vajda, supra note 52, at 18. 
54 See Nouwen, supra note 14, at 26. 
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by contrast, may either be unable to reconfigure or have to make difficult 
zero-sum choices concerning which suspects and crimes it will pursue.  
 
Because neither of these two options is desirable, a state that believes the 
OTP might intervene may simply delay opening national investigations until 
it knows which suspects and which conduct the OTP intends to investigate. 
That is an undesirable strategy from the standpoint of combating impunity: 
in terms of maximising the likelihood of convictions, the earlier a state begins 
to investigate international crimes, the better.55 Moreover, insofar as justice 
does promote peace – an issue well beyond the scope of this Article – 
delaying national investigations is obviously counterproductive. But it would 
be a rational strategy nonetheless, precisely because of the SSC requirement. 
 
B. Cases 
 
The SSC requirement plays an even more critical role when a state (or 
suspect) challenges the admissibility of a specific case. Here the question is 
whether a national proceeding ‘sufficiently mirrors’ the OTP’s.56 The Pre-
Trial Chambers consistently held that the two proceedings must involve the 
‘same conduct’.57 In the Kenya cases, however, the Appeals Chamber relaxed 
that requirement, holding that it is enough for a national proceeding to 
involve ‘substantially the same conduct’ as the international one.58 
 
As Stahn notes, the Appeals Chamber ‘failed to explain the origin, meaning, 
and legal basis of this differentiation’.59 The most reasonable interpretation 
is that it simply believed the ‘same conduct’ requirement made it too difficult 
for states to challenge admissibility. That is the OTP’s interpretation.60 
Regardless, the differentiation seems completely unprincipled from the 
                                                        
55 See Nystedt et al., supra note 52, at 64. 
56 Judgment on the appeal of Libya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber 
I of 31 May 2013 entitled ‘Decision on the admissibility of the case against 
Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi’, Gaddafi and Al-Senussi (CC-01/11-01/11), Appeals 
Chamber, 21 May 2014, § 73 (Gaddafi Appeals Judgment). 
57 See, e.g., Ruto Admissibility Decision, supra note 26, § 55. 
58 See, e.g., Kenyatta Appeals Judgment, supra note 8, § 39. 
59 C. Stahn, ‘Admissibility Challenges before the ICC From Quasi-Primacy to 
Qualified Deference?’ in C. Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the 
International Criminal Court (Oxford University Press, 2015) 228, at 242. 
60 Prosecution’s Response to ‘ pplication on behalf of the Government of 
Libya relating to Abdullah Al-Senussi pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC 
Statute, Gaddafi and Al-Senussi (ICC-01/11-01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 2 
May 2013, § 32 (arguing that ‘the addition of the word “substantially” 
introduces a small degree of flexibility into the same conduct test, but not to 
the point that it undermines the purpose of the test altogether’.). 
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standpoint of treaty interpretation. For better or worse, the more restrictive 
standard has a clear textual basis in the Rome Statute: Art. 20(3), the 
‘upward’ ne bis in idem provision, prohibits the ICC from retrying an 
individual for the ‘same conduct’ that was at issue in a previous trial, and Art. 
90(1) requires states to notify the Court and the other state whenever it is 
faced with competing surrender requests involving ‘the same conduct’. The 
‘substantially the same conduct’ standard, by contrast, appears nowhere in 
the Rome Statute. Indeed, Stahn convincingly argues that the Appeals 
Chamber simply borrowed it from Art. 35(2)(b) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, which deals with the admissibility of subsequent 
applications to the European Court.61 
 
In any case, given how the Appeals Chamber has interpreted ‘substantially 
the same conduct’, the change is less practically important than it might 
appear. The Pre-Trial Chamber adopted a quite flexible interpretation of the 
standard in Al-Senussi, rejecting the OTP’s insistence that the national and 
international investigations must focus on substantially the same incidents in 
favor of a more holistic comparison between the two investigations’ 
‘temporal, geographic and material parameters’.62 In Gaddafi, however, the 
Appeals Chamber specifically adopted an incident-based comparator for the 
SSC requirement: 
 
If, and perhaps most straightforwardly, the underlying 
incidents that the Prosecutor and the State are 
investigating are identical, the case will be inadmissible 
before the Court (subject to any finding of 
unwillingness or inability). At the other end of the scale, 
the Appeals Chamber finds it hard to envisage a 
situation in which the Prosecutor and a State can be 
said to be investigating the same case in circumstances 
in which they are not investigating any of the same 
underlying incidents. The real issue is, therefore, the 
degree of overlap required as between the incidents 
being investigated by the Prosecutor and those being 
investigated by a State – with the focus being upon 
whether the conduct is substantially the same. Again, 
this will depend upon the facts of the individual case.63  
 
                                                        
61 Stahn, Quasi-Primacy, supra note 59, at 242. 
62 Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi, 
Gaddafi and Al-Senussi (ICC-01/11-01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 11 Oct. 2013, 
§ 75 (Al-Senussi Admissibility Decision). 
63 Gaddafi Appeals Judgment, supra note 56, § 72. 
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To be sure, even with this interpretation the ‘substantially the same conduct’ 
requirement is less restrictive than the ‘same conduct’ requirement. But it 
still imposes significant and unjustifiable costs on both states and the ICC.  
 
1. Primacy 
 
The fundamental problem with the SSC requirement is that it is simply 
inconsistent with the principle of complementarity. As noted earlier, the 
object and purpose of the principle is ‘to protect sovereign interests in the 
pursuit of justice for crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction’.64 That is why 
states insisted that the Court’s right to pre-empt a national proceeding must 
be an ‘exceptional power’, one it can exercise only when a state is unwilling 
or unable to genuinely investigate or prosecute. The SSC requirement, 
however, makes admissibility the norm, not the exception: a state can ensure 
the inadmissibility of a particular case only by deferring to the OTP’s choice 
of incidents to investigate. Any substantial deviation, no matter how 
justifiable, will render the case admissible.65  
 
Even worse, the SSC requirement forces states to constantly predict which 
incidents the OTP will ultimately decide to prosecute, because those 
incidents are subject to change until the beginning of trial. The relevant 
incidents will first be identified in the OTP’s request to authorise an 
investigation, but that request is, for obvious reasons, ‘preliminary in nature 
and is not binding for future admissibility assessments’.66 The incidents will 
then be specified in more detail in the arrest warrant or summons for a 
specific suspect, but Art. 61(4) of the Rome Statute gives the OTP the 
absolute right to ‘continue the investigation and amend... any charges’ until 
the confirmation of charges hearing. And not even the incidents in the 
confirmed charges are necessarily final: pursuant to  rt. 61(9), ‘[a]fter the 
charges are confirmed and before the trial has begun, the Prosecutor may, 
                                                        
64 Nouwen, supra note 14, at 58. 
65 See, e.g., Stahn, Quasi-Primacy, supra note 59, at 243 (‘The method of 
comparison promoted by the Appeals Chamber makes it difficult for states to 
challenge admissibility. It pays little attention to whether and how broader 
goals of international justice are achieved, since it largely excludes goals and 
context from the assessment’.); Nouwen, supra note 14, at 58-59 (‘This 
approach does not recognise, and does not want to recognise, that a state 
that has genuinely investigated or prosecuted that person for different 
conduct or for different incidents, possibly more serious ones, may have a 
legitimate interest in guaranteeing that he or she will not be tried before an 
international tribunal after a domestic trial’.). 
66 Kenya Article 15 Decision, supra note 50, § 50. 
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with the permission of the Pre-Trial Chamber and after notice to the accused, 
amend the charges’.67 
 
In practice, then, the SSC requirement encourages a state to wait until the eve 
of trial to challenge admissibility68 – a result completely at odds with Art. 
19(5)’s insistence that a state ‘shall make a challenge at the earliest 
opportunity’. If the state does not wait until the eve of trial, a successful 
admissibility challenge could easily prove to be a pyrrhic victory: the OTP 
can simply request a review of the Court’s decision on the ground that ‘new 
facts have arisen’ that dictate prosecuting different incidents than those at 
issue in the admissibility challenge.69 The state would then presumably be 
entitled to file a second admissibility challenge pursuant to Art. 19(4), but it 
would need the Court’s permission to do so.  nd, of course, that second 
challenge would succeed only if the state was able to demonstrate prior to 
trial that it had taken ‘concrete and progressive investigative steps’ regarding 
the OTP’s amended incidents, because that is the latest a state can challenge 
admissibility on grounds other than ne bis in idem.70 If the state was too slow, 
its challenge would fail the SSC requirement and it would be deemed 
‘inactive’ in the case.  
 
The SSC requirement, in short, means that states are completely at the mercy 
of the OTP. If the OTP is sufficiently committed to prosecuting a suspect itself, 
it will almost always be able to do so. This is not complementarity – it is 
primacy.71  s Mc uliffe says, because of the SSC requirement, ‘the watchdog 
function has slipped in the hierarchy as the Court rejects a monitoring role in 
favour of assuming the prosecutorial and judicial initiative in a manner 
characteristic of a more vertical relationship’.72 For that reason alone the 
requirement should be eliminated. 
 
2. Likelihood of Conviction  
 
                                                        
67 A new confirmation of charges hearing must be held, of course, if the 
amendments add new charges or substitute more serious charges. Art. 61(9) 
ICCSt. 
68 As specifically permitted by Art. 19(4) ICCSt. See also Stahn, Quasi-
Primacy, supra note 59, at 247. 
69 Art. 17(10) ICCSt. 
70 Art. 19(4) ICCSt. 
71 See Ušacka Gaddafi Dissent, supra note 5, § 52 (‘Instead of complementing 
each other, the relationship between the Court and the State would be 
competitive, requiring the State to do its utmost to fulfill the requirements 
set by the Court’.). 
72 McAuliffe, supra note 16, at 261. 
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Although many considerations influence how a national prosecutor uses his 
or her discretion, the most important is whether a particular prosecution is 
likely to result in conviction.73 No matter how well intentioned, an acquittal 
has no expressive value and wastes valuable investigative, prosecutorial, and 
judicial resources.74 An acquittal can even undermine the legitimacy of the 
national criminal-justice system itself. As Concannon notes, pointing to Haiti 
as an example, ‘[f]or a transitional government trying to consolidate 
democracy, especially one having mixed success, prominent human rights 
trials pose significant political, social, and security risks. If the trial is not 
successful, the government loses credibility and confidence in the justice 
system is further eroded, thus creating another flash point for criticism’.75  
 
In some situations, a state may be able to prosecute substantially the same 
conduct as the ICC no less effectively than it could prosecute different 
conduct – especially now that the Appeals Chamber has made clear that the 
principle of complementarity permits states to charge suspects with ordinary 
domestic crimes instead of international crimes.76 For a variety of reasons, 
though, there will be many situations in which a prosecution based on 
different conduct will be much more likely to succeed than one based on the 
same conduct. In those situations, the  ppeals Chamber’s mechanical 
insistence on using the SSC requirement to determine whether a state is 
‘active’ is both counterproductive and indefensible. 
 
a. Investigation 
 
                                                        
73 See, e.g., D.D. Ntanda Nsereko, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion Before National 
Courts and International Tribunals’, 3 JICJ (2004) 124-144, at 131  (noting 
that it would not be in the public interest to commence proceedings ‘where 
the evidence is weak and the prospects of a conviction remote’). 
74 Ibid. 
75 B. Concannon, Jr., ‘Beyond Complementarity: The International Criminal 
Court and National Prosecutions, a View from Haiti’, 32 Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review (2000) 201-250, at 235.  
76 See Judgment  on the appeal of Mr Abdullah Al-Senussi against the 
decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 October 2013 entitled ‘Decision on the 
admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi’, Gaddafi and Al-Senussi 
(ICC-OI/II-OI/II OA 6), Appeals Chamber, 24 July 2014, § 119 (Al-Senussi 
Appeals Judgment) (noting with regard to complementarity that “there is no 
requirement in the Statute for a crime to be prosecuted as an international 
crime domestically,” because “it is the alleged conduct, as opposed to its legal 
characterisation, that matters”). 
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No prosecution can hope to succeed unless the authorities are able to 
develop the necessary evidence against the suspect.77 The SSC requirement 
thus implicitly assumes that proving the criminal conduct targeted by the 
OTP will be no more difficult than proving unrelated criminal conduct. But 
that will not always be true, for a variety of reasons: 
 
 Availability of Evidence. The OTP’s case might require scarce and 
fragmentary forensic evidence, while the state’s preferred case could be 
proven through easily obtained documentary evidence. Or the OTP’s case 
might require investigating a territorial area that is still experiencing 
conflict, while the state’s preferred case involves an area under complete 
government control.78 
 
 Reliability of evidence. The OTP’s case might require eyewitness 
testimony, which is notoriously unreliable,79 while the state’s preferred 
case could be proven solely through forensic evidence that is nearly 
impossible to discredit. 
 
 Complexity of evidence. The OTP’s case might be based on forensic 
evidence that requires expert investigators and access to specialised 
scientific equipment, while the state’s preferred case could be proven 
solely through documentary evidence. Or the OTP’s case might require 
complicated statistical analysis of a large number of documents, while the 
state’s preferred case requires only eyewitness testimony. 
 
These hypothetical examples could be multiplied indefinitely. The point is 
simply that, from an evidential standpoint, there will be many situations in 
which a state will be better off investigating conduct that does not satisfy the 
                                                        
77 See, e.g., P.C. Stenning, ‘Discretion, Politics, and the Public Interest in ‘High-
Profile’ Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions’, Canadian Journal of Law 
and Society (2009) 337-366, at 337 (noting that ‘police and prosecutorial 
resources not being infinite, the investigator or prosecutor must decide 
whether there is enough evidence, or potential evidence, to justify an 
investigation or prosecution’). 
78 See M.B. Harmon & F. Gaynor, ‘Prosecuting Massive Crimes with Primitive 
Tools: Three Difficulties Encountered by Prosecutors in International 
Criminal Proceedings’, 2 JICJ (2004) 403-426, at 406 (‘Investigating a crime 
in an area in which armed conflict still rages or has recently terminated is 
obviously logistically more complicated than investigating a crime in times of 
domestic tranquility’.). 
79 X. .  ranburu, ‘Methodology for Criminal Investigation of International 
Crimes’, in  . Smeulers (ed.), Collective Violence and International Criminal 
Justice: an Interdisciplinary Approach (Intersentia, 2010) 353, at 367. 
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SSC requirement – what we might call the ‘ l Capone Effect’.80 In such a 
situation, as long as there is no reason to believe the state is trying to shield 
the suspect from criminal responsibility, the state should be permitted to 
investigate the different conduct without the case becoming admissible. 
 
To be sure, this conclusion assumes states are generally better able than the 
OTP to identify which conduct can be most effectively investigated. But that 
is a safe assumption, given the OTP’s limited resources. Because of its lack of 
resources, the OTP has traditionally been forced to pursue a policy of 
‘focused investigations’81 that last only a few months and address ‘as few 
witnesses and incidents as possible’.82 Those investigations involve small 
teams of rotating investigators – a maximum of 12 for the entire DRC 
situation, for example83 – and limit the investigators to no more than a few 
short-term missions, which means that they spend ‘relatively little time in 
the field’.84 Indeed, the number of staff allocated to investigative teams 
actually declined between 2007 and 2013, no doubt reflecting the increase in 
the number of situations the OTP was investigating.85 
 
Lean staffing and short-term missions are clearly cost-effective, but they are 
antithetical to thorough investigation. HRW has claimed that there are 
‘simply not enough [investigators] to handle the rigorous demands for 
                                                        
80 Capone was convicted of tax evasion, even though the US government 
would have preferred to prosecute him murder. The FBI was simply unable 
to connect him to any of the murders for which he was almost certainly 
responsible. 
81 C.M. De Vos, ‘Investigating from  far: The ICC’s Evidence Problem’, 26 
Leiden Journal of International Law (2013) 1009-1024, at 1014. 
82 This according to a former head of the OTP’s Jurisdiction, 
Complementarity, and Cooperation Division. See K. Glassborow, ‘ICC 
Investigative Strategy on Sexual Violence Crimes under Fire’, Institute for 
War & Peace Reporting, 27 October 2008, available online at 
http://iwpr.net/report-news/icc-investigative-strategy-under-fire.    
83 De Vos, supra note 81, at 1014. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Susana SáCouto & Katherine Cleary Thompson, ‘Investigative Management, 
Strategies, and Techniques of the ICC’s OTP’, in Stahn, supra note 59, at 338. 
The OTP’s recent “Basic Size” document suggests that the Office intends to 
dedicate more of its budget to investigation, such as by adding 25 new 
investigators. See ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Report of the Court on  the 
Basic Size of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-ASP/14/21 (2015), at § 29 
(Basic Size Document). The contemplated increases, however, are unlikely to 
fundamentally transform the nature of the OTP’s investigations. 
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conducting investigations’.86 De Vos argues that the brevity of field missions 
– an average of 10 days in the DRC situation – makes it difficult for 
investigators ‘to even interview witnesses, much less to develop the sort of 
long-term connections that amore sustained field presence would enable’.87 
And Kambale has argued, combining the two critiques, that the DRC 
investigative teams were simply ‘too undersized and too short-term to 
generate good analysis of the intricately entangled criminal activities’ in the 
Ituri area. Indeed, he believes that the OTP’s failure to bring charges against 
DRC suspects more important than Lubanga was ‘a direct result of the 
prosecutor’s strategy of conducting quick investigations with the lowest cost 
possible’.88   
 
It is important not to overstate national investigative resources. But even the 
most resource-poor states – including those that have recently emerged from 
conflict – will generally have greater resources than the ICC.89 National 
investigators also obviously have the kind of permanent in-country 
investigative presence that the ICC does not. In almost every situation, 
therefore, a state will be able to conduct a more intensive and wider-ranging 
investigation than the OTP.90 
 
Nor is that all. Effective investigation is not simply a function of resources; it 
also requires investigators to have a sound understanding of the local 
situation. And here, too, states have an inherent advantage over the ICC: 
 
Unlike international tribunals, domestic prosecutors do 
not need to gather information to develop their 
knowledge and understanding of the political, military 
and security structures of the parties to the conflicts. 
Likewise, unlike international counterparts, local 
                                                        
86 Human Rights Watch, ‘Letter to the Executive Committee of the 
Prosecutor’, 15 September 2008, available online at http://www.article42-
3.org/Secret%20Human%20Rights%20Watch%20Letter.pdf 
87 De Vos, supra note 81, at 1016. 
88 P. Kambale, ‘The ICC and Lubanga: Missed Opportunities’, SSRC Forums: 
African Futures, 16 March 2012, available online at 
www.forums.ssrc.org/african-futures/2012/03/16/african-futures-icc-
missed-opportunities.    
89 M. Tedeschini, ‘Complementarity in Practice: the ICC’s Inconsistent 
Approach in the Gaddafi and Al-Senussi  dmissibility Decisions’, 7 Amsterdam 
Legal Forum (2015) 76-97, at 78; see also Basic Size Document, supra note 
85, at § 44 (noting that ‘the ICC has had to investigate crimes comparable to 
the worst crimes to take place in domestic jurisdictions, but has had far 
fewer resources than those domestic investigations’). 
90 De Vos, supra note 81, at 1014. 
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prosecutors do not need to acquire knowledge of the 
historical and political background to the conflict. Nor 
is there a need to build knowledge on the area of the 
conflict. Much less, if any, translation and interpretation 
are required.91 
 
This domestic advantage has been particularly pronounced at the ICC. As of 
2013, not even one OTP investigator had been a national of the state he or 
she was investigating.92 Even worse, unlike its ad hoc counterparts, the OTP 
had not hired a single country expert either full-time or part-time,93 
choosing instead to rely exclusively on volunteer local intermediaries.94 The 
OTP’s lack of country-specific knowledge came back to haunt it in the DRC: 
according to one intermediary from Ituri, the OTP ‘faced difficulties in 
assessing places and was unfamiliar with the socio-political context... did not 
understand the complicated war-time alliances, and did not grasp the 
subtleties of ‘who was close to who’ in a toxic environment nor ‘who could 
do what’’.95 Even the use of local intermediaries did not help, because they 
were largely unsupervised and were never included in OTP strategising.96 
 
Because of their generally superior investigative resources and greater local 
knowledge, national prosecutors are likely to identify provable conduct than 
their international counterparts. The  ppeals Chamber’s interpretation of 
Art. 17, however, renders their superior knowledge meaningless: even if 
prosecuting substantially the same conduct as the OTP will be much more 
likely to result in an acquittal, any attempt to prosecute different conduct 
will automatically make a case admissible. 
 
b. Charges 
 
For all the reasons discussed above, it is counterproductive to require a state 
to prosecute the same conduct as the OTP when it could prosecute different 
conduct more effectively. In some situations, the more easily proven conduct 
might actually involve the same charges, such as the war crime of murder – 
the state simply bases the charges on different incidents than the OTP. But in 
other situations the more easily proven charge may be based on different 
                                                        
91 V. Tochilovsky, ‘Post-Conflict Criminal Justice: Practical and Policy 
Considerations’ in M. Bergsmo (ed.), Criteria for Prioritizing and Selecting 
Core International Crimes Cases (Torkel Opsahl Academic Publisher, 2d ed., 
2010) 237, at 238.  
92 De Vos, supra note 81, at 1019. 
93 Ibid. at 1020. 
94 Ibid. at 1021. 
95 Quoted in ibid. at 1020. 
96 Kambale, supra note 88. 
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conduct: the OTP charges the suspect with the war crime of murder; the state 
charges the suspect with the war crime of rape – or even with ‘ordinary’ rape, 
now that it’s clear states do not have to charge international crimes as 
international crimes. 
 
It is also likely, of course, that there are some situations in which a state can 
prosecute the same conduct as the OTP no less effectively than it could 
prosecute different conduct. It is tempting to argue that the SSC requirement 
should apply in that situation. But doing so overlooks a critical point: namely, 
that the selection of charges is driven by more than the availability of 
evidence. There may be many legitimate non-evidentiary reasons – reasons 
that do not exhibit unwillingness – for a state to prosecute a suspect on 
charges involving different conduct. 
 
Most obviously, national prosecutors might rationally conclude that popular 
or elite opposition makes it too politically dangerous to mirror the OTP’s 
case. In such a situation, the SSC requirement forces the state to either cede 
control of the case to the ICC or prosecute the same conduct and risk political 
destabilization – an easy choice. Eliminate the SSC requirement, however, 
and that Hobson’s choice disappears: national prosecutors can prosecute the 
suspect on charges involving different and less controversial conduct, 
thereby avoiding destabilization while still protecting state sovereignty. 
 
To be sure, elites or the populace may oppose prosecuting certain suspects – 
a popular Head of State, a war-hero General – regardless of the charges 
against them. But that will not always be the case. As Mark Osiel has noted, 
for example, prosecutions of high-ranking government officials for actions 
during the Dirty War in Latin America and the Arab Spring in the Middle East 
have been far more successful ‘when focused more on charges of financial 
corruption (always indefensible, in voters’ eyes) than atrocities (sometimes 
so, depending on whose terrorists, ours or theirs, get the garrote)’.97  
 
A state might also rationally prefer to prosecute different conduct than the 
OTP because of the interests of victims. There is no guarantee that an OTP 
prosecution will better align with victim preferences than a national 
prosecution; in fact, given the state’s vastly superior local knowledge, the 
opposite is more likely to be true. The Lubanga case is a good example: 
victims groups were outraged by the OTP’s refusal to charge Lubanga with 
crimes involving sexual violence.98 Given the ICC’s emphasis on victims’ 
                                                        
97 M.J. Osiel, ‘The Demise of International Criminal Law’, Humanity (June 
2014) 1, at 5, available online at http://humanityjournal.org/blog/the-
demise-of-international-criminal-law/. 
98 See J. McBride, The War Crime of Child Soldier Recruitment (Springer, 
2013), at 157. 
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rights,99 it makes no sense in such a situation – ceteris paribus – to prevent 
the state from prosecuting the conduct the victims have identified as the 
most important. Yet that is precisely what the SSC requirement does.  
 
Finally, eliminating the SSC requirement would permit states to prosecute 
more serious charges than the OTP. There is no guarantee that the OTP will 
always pursue the most serious possible charges against a suspect; on the 
contrary, given its investigative limits relative to states, it may well have no 
choice but to pursue lesser charges. That was clearly the case in Lubanga, 
where the OTP pre-empted national charges involving murder, illegal 
detention, and torture in order to prosecute Lubanga for enlisting and using 
child soldiers.100 And it was likely the case in Katanga, as well. In challenging 
admissibility, Katanga argued that the ‘same conduct’ test was inconsistent 
with the principle of complementarity in his case because he was facing 
much more serious crimes in the DRC than at the ICC – genocide vs. crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. The Pre-Trial Chamber and Appeals 
Chamber nevertheless affirmed the same-conduct test and deemed his case 
admissible.101 
 
c. Modes of Participation 
 
The SSC requirement might also require national prosecutors to pursue a 
mode of participation that is much more difficult to prove than a mode that 
would be available for different conduct. The most obvious example is 
command responsibility, which requires prosecutors to prove the crimes 
committed by the commander’s subordinates, the commander’s knowledge 
of those crimes, and the commander’s effective control.102 International 
prosecutors normally rely on command responsibility when they cannot 
connect the suspect to international crimes more directly, so it is unlikely 
that a state could render a command-responsibility case inadmissible by 
using the same conduct to prove a different mode of participation. That 
problem would disappear, however, in the absence of the SSC requirement: 
national prosecutors would then have the option of focusing on different 
conduct that supports an easier-to-prove mode of participation – such as a 
crime that the suspect ordered instead of failed to prevent.  
 
d. Gap-Filling 
                                                        
99 See, e.g., Art. 65(4) ICCSt. 
100 Decision on the Prosecutor’s  pplication for a Warrant of  rrest, Lubanga 
(ICC-01/04-01/06), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 10 Feb. 2006, § 33 (Lubanga Arrest 
Warrant). 
101 See Stahn, Quasi-Primacy, supra note 59, at 233. 
102 K.J. Heller, ‘  Sentence-Based Theory of Complementarity’, 53 Harvard 
International Law Journal (HILJ) (2012) 86-132, at 103. 
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Similar considerations apply when the OTP prosecutes conduct that a state 
cannot prosecute because of a gap in its domestic criminal law. A number of 
states, for example, either lack a provision on command responsibility 
(Sudan103) or treat it as a substantive offence instead of as a mode of 
participation (Canada104). Similarly, some international crimes simply lack 
ordinary domestic crime counterparts. The crime against humanity of 
persecution and war crimes such as denying quarter and recruiting child 
soldiers are the most obvious examples. In such situations, unless the state 
has incorporated international crimes, the SSC requirement will render a 
case admissible no matter how genuinely the state wants to bring the suspect 
to justice. Once again, though, the problem would be solved by eliminating 
the SSC requirement: the state could then simply charge the suspect with 
crimes based on different conduct. 
 
3. Strategic Considerations 
 
The SSC requirement can also needlessly undermine sound national 
prosecutorial strategies. Consider a situation in which a state wants to 
prosecute a suspect for a small subset of the conduct underlying the OTP’s 
charges. That is a realistic possibility in the Ongwen case, given the OTP’s 
recent announcement that it intends to charge Ongwen with 70 counts of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity based on nearly a half-dozen different 
attacks.105 If Uganda had wanted to prosecute Ongwen itself, it may well have 
preferred to charge him with only a few of those attacks in order to simplify 
the prosecution, shorten the resulting trial, and conserve investigative, 
prosecutorial, and judicial resources. But would such a targeted national 
prosecution have satisfied the SSC requirement? 
 
The answer, unfortunately, is unclear. In the Gaddafi case, the Appeals 
Chamber offered the following cryptic thoughts on the subject: 
 
If there is a large overlap between the incidents under 
investigation, it may be clear that the State is 
investigating substantially the same conduct; if the 
overlap is smaller, depending upon the precise facts, it 
may be that the State is still investigating substantially 
the same conduct or that it is investigating only a very 
small part of the Prosecutor's case. For example, the 
incidents that it is investigating may, in fact, form the 
                                                        
103 Ibid. at 124. 
104 Ibid. at 116. 
105 Case Information Sheet, Prosecutor v Dominic Ongwen (ICC-PIDS-CIS-UGA-
02-009/16_Eng), 10 Feb. 2016. 
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crux of the Prosecutor's case and/or represent the most 
serious aspects of the case. Alternatively, they may be 
very minor when compared with the case as a whole.106 
 
This statement appears to suggest that the SSC requirement permits a state 
to pursue a more targeted national case as long as it covers the ‘crux’ of the 
OTP’s case – i.e., its ‘most serious aspects’. But that standard is simply 
unworkable. What is the crux of the Ongwen case? How should the Court 
determine its ‘most serious aspects’? It obviously could not ask the OTP – if 
the OTP wanted to ensure admissibility, it would simply identify conduct the 
state is not prosecuting as the ‘crux’ of its case – and the Court would have 
difficulty making that decision itself, given the near-impossibility of 
comparing the gravity of international crimes.107 Moreover, any attempt by 
the judges to identify the most serious aspects of the OTP’s case would be 
difficult to reconcile with prosecutorial independence.108 The solution is thus 
obvious: eliminate the SSC requirement. In the absence of the requirement, a 
state would be free to conduct a targeted prosecution as long as its decision 
to do so did not reflect unwillingness. 
 
The SSC requirement can also create the opposite problem: discouraging a 
state from pursuing a prosecution that is more ambitious than the OTP’s. 
Again consider the Lubanga case: although the OTP prosecuted him only for 
the war crime of enlisting and using child soldiers, the DRC had arrested him 
on suspicion of murder, illegal detention, and torture. Had the DRC 
challenged admissibility, Lubanga’s case would have been admissible, despite 
its much greater scope, simply because of the SSC requirement. 
 
To be sure, the SSC requirement would not have been an insuperable 
obstacle in that situation: the DRC could always have added the child-soldiers 
charges to its national case. But there may well be situations in which a state 
wants to pursue a wider investigation that – for any of the reasons identified 
above – does not include the OTP’s chosen conduct. There is no justification 
for using the SSC requirement to reject an admissibility challenge in such 
situations. Indeed, Judge Ušacka described that very possibility as ‘perverse’ 
in her Gaddafi dissent.109 
 
 4. Capacity Building 
                                                        
106 Gaddafi Appeals Judgment, supra note 56, § 72. 
107 See generally A.M. Danner, ‘Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in 
International Criminal Law’, 87 Virginia Law Review (2001) 415-501. 
108 See generally K.J. Heller, ‘The Role of the International Prosecutor’ in C. 
Romano et al. (eds.), Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (Oxford 
University Press, 2014) 669-689. 
109 Ušacka Gaddafi Dissent, supra note 5, § 55. 
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Eliminating the SSC requirement would facilitate national capacity building. 
One reason is obvious: because the requirement is so restrictive and ICC-
centric, permitting states to prosecute different conduct would significantly 
increase the number of cases that states could prosecute themselves, thereby 
requiring them to strengthen their investigative, prosecutorial, and judicial 
systems.110 But the capacity-building effect of genuine complementarity 
would not simply be the product of need: states that are given the primary 
authority to prosecute international crimes are much more likely to want to 
build national capacity than states that are left to feed on the ICC’s crumbs. 
That is one of the critical lessons of the ICTY’s move from sticks to carrots 
through the adoption of Rule 11bis, which had a profoundly transformative 
effect on Bosnia’s criminal-justice system: 
 
The stick of removing cases from Bosnian jurisdiction 
under Rules of the Road clearly did not suffice to impel 
fair trial domestically, but the carrot of transfer back to 
the domestic justice system did. Once the 
internationalist paradigm of the ICTY gave way to the 
need to devolve responsibility to the states, the 
proposed solution was the aforementioned War Crimes 
Chamber created within the State Court and while a 
prosecutorial Special Department for War Crimes 
formed inside the national Prosecutor’s Office... [I]t 
would appear that, were it not for the ICTY Completion 
Strategy, national capacities such as those which are 
now in existence may never have been created’.111 
 
To be sure, eliminating the SSC requirement would not magically convince all 
of the states under the ICC’s watchful eye to become the next Bosnia. But if 
even a few of them were motivated to build domestic capacity by the 
prospect of not having their prosecutorial choices driven by the OTP, 
eliminating the SSC requirement would be more than worth it. 
 
5. State Cooperation 
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A much more state-centric principle of complementarity might also make 
states more willing to cooperate with the ICC.112 Because the Court lacks 
effective enforcement mechanisms, few if any OTP prosecutions will succeed 
without state cooperation.113 Such cooperation is always unlikely when a 
state loses an admissibility challenge, as the Kenyatta debacle indicates. But 
it is reasonable to assume that cooperation is even less likely when a state 
believes that its domestic accountability processes are being unfairly 
micromanaged by the OTP. Chehtman, for example, ascribes the generally 
hostile relationship between the OTP and Colombia to the latter’s resentment 
of the former’s patronising and seemingly-endless ‘observation’ of 
Colombian legal processes.114 Creating a more state-centric complementarity 
regime by eliminating the SSC requirement would thus presumably 
encourage greater cooperation by states, at least at the margins. 
 
 6. National Resources 
 
Greater flexibility in case-selection at the national level would have the 
additional benefit of conserving national investigative, prosecutorial, and 
judicial resources. In practice, the SSC requirement means that case selection 
is driven by the OTP, not by national prosecutors. Yet, for all the reasons 
discussed above, national prosecutors are far better equipped than the OTP 
to make intelligent decisions concerning which conduct can be most 
efficiently investigated and which charges can be most easily proven. The 
ability to pursue targeted prosecutions is particularly critical in this regard. 
States emerging from conflict often suffer from operational capacity 
problems and a large backlog of cases.115 Forcing such a state to mirror a 
sprawling OTP prosecution such as Ongwen’s will simply exacerbate those 
problems, whereas allowing that state to pursue smaller prosecutions – even 
ones based on different conduct that the state determines can be more easily 
investigated and prosecuted – would minimise them.  
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 7. ICC Resources 
 
For similar reasons, eliminating the SSC requirement would conserve the 
ICC’s limited resources. Given the Court’s ‘finite capacities’, it is imperative to 
get the principle of complementarity right – ‘every case pursued at the 
expense of domestic jurisdiction is also pursued at the expense of another 
potential ICC prosecution’.116 There is thus no justification whatsoever for 
permitting the OTP to pre-empt a genuine national prosecution simply 
because the state has decided to focus on different conduct. The admissibility 
of Simone Gbagbo’s case is a perfect illustration: given that she is already 
facing 20 years in prison – six years longer than the ICC’s longest sentence to 
date – what does the ICC possibly have to gain from (re-)prosecuting her? 
 
 
C. Rationales for the SSC Requirement 
 
The SSC requirement, in short, imposes very significant costs on both states 
and the ICC. Those costs might be acceptable if there was a convincing 
rationale for maintaining the requirement. But there isn’t one. Some possible 
rationales have already been considered and rejected, such as that the SSC 
requirement maximises the likelihood of conviction, better reflects the 
interests of victims, or ensures that the suspect stands trial for his or her 
most serious conduct. Indeed, now that the Appeals Chamber has made clear 
that states are free to prosecute international crimes as ordinary domestic 
crimes, the only question is whether a state’s selection of conduct exhibits an 
unwillingness to genuinely investigate or prosecute. And that issue is 
analytically distinct from whether the state is ‘active’ with regard to the 
OTP’s case, as the  ppeals Chamber itself has insisted. 
 
There are, then, only two possible objections to eliminating the SSC 
requirement. The first is avowedly positivist: namely, that the SSC 
requirement is an integral part of the Rome Statute. There are two problems 
with that argument. To begin with, as explained above, the textually 
defensible test is ‘same conduct’, not ‘substantially the same conduct’. So the 
judges have already taken pragmatic liberty with the Rome Statute in order 
to ensure that the principle of complementarity is not too restrictive. 
Moreover, the objection does not actually provide a substantive defence of 
the SSC requirement. It simply points out that eliminating it would likely 
require amending the Rome Statute. 
 
The second objection, which has been advanced in a thoughtful article by 
Darryl Robinson, is more serious: that it is unnecessary to eliminate the SSC 
requirement, because ‘[t]he Rome Statute already provides solutions to the 
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scenario where a state wishes to prosecute a person for a different crime’.117 
He identifies three such solutions: (1) Art. 94(1), which provides that ‘[i]f the 
immediate execution of a request would interfere with an ongoing 
investigation or prosecution of a case different from that to which the 
request relates, the requested State may postpone the execution of the 
request for a period of time agreed upon with the Court’; (2)  rt. 89(4), 
which provides that ‘[i]f the person sought is being proceeded against or is 
serving a sentence in the requested State for a crime different from that for 
which surrender to the Court is sought, the requested State, after making its 
decision to grant the request, shall consult with the Court’; and (3)  rt. 
53(2)(c), which permits the OTP to decline to prosecute an otherwise-
admissible case if doing so ‘is not in the interests of justice, taking into 
account all the circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests 
of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her 
role in the alleged crime’. 
 
None of these provisions, however, is an adequate substitute for eliminating 
the SSC requirement. Art. 94(1) can be quickly dismissed: the Pre-Trial 
Chamber specifically held in Gaddafi that it applies only to cooperation 
requests other than surrender, because Art. 89(4) ‘is a lex specialis provision 
that specifically relates to surrender requests’.118 The Appeals Chamber has 
not addressed that issue, but it is unlikely it would disagree with the PTC. As 
the PTC noted, its interpretation of  rt. 94(1) is ‘supported by both the 
drafting history and learned commentators who have examined the issue’.119 
 
If Art. 89(4) required the ICC to defer to a genuine national investigation or 
prosecution involving different conduct, it might be an adequate substitute 
for eliminating the SSC requirement. But that is almost certainly not the case. 
First, Art. 89(4) is directed at states, not at the Court itself – suggesting that 
the provision is intended to limit, not recognise, the freedom of states to 
pursue different-conduct proceedings. Second, the provision requires a state 
to agree to surrender the suspect before consulting with the Court – an 
unusual procedural requirement if a state has an absolute right to proceed 
with a different-conduct prosecution despite a competing surrender request. 
Third, unlike Art. 94(1), Art. 89(4) does not even mention the possibility of 
postponing the ICC prosecution following consultation – a contrast 
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emphasised by the Pre-Trial Chamber in Gaddafi.120 Fourth, and finally, a 
hard deferral requirement would mean that the Rome Statute actually makes 
it easier for a state to pursue a proceeding based on different conduct than a 
proceeding on the same conduct, which makes no sense. 
 
At best, then, Art. 89(4) permits but does not require the ICC to defer to a 
national proceeding that is based on different conduct. That possibility 
hardly justifies maintaining the SSC requirement; after all, the point of 
eliminating the requirement is precisely to ensure that a state’s right to 
conduct a competing investigation or prosecution is limited solely by its 
willingness to bring a suspect to justice. Requiring a state to convince the 
Court to defer to a national proceeding is still primacy instead of 
complementarity – especially given that Art. 89(4) does not specify the 
criteria the Court is supposed to use to make the deferral decision. 
 
That leaves Art. 53(2)(c). The problem with arguing that the ‘interests of 
justice’ provision makes it unnecessary to eliminate the SSC requirement is 
obvious: the provision empowers only the OTP to decline to prosecute a 
suspect. The Pre-Trial Chamber does not have that power: although the PTC 
can order the OTP to prosecute a case it doesn’t want to pursue because of 
the interests of justice, it cannot prevent the OTP from prosecuting a case it 
does want to pursue. That asymmetry follows ineluctably from Article 
53(3)(b) of the Rome Statute.121 The ‘interests of justice’ provision is thus 
even less of a substitute for eliminating the SSC requirement than Art. 89(4), 
because it leaves the fate of a national proceeding based on different conduct 
solely in the hands of the OTP, which has shown little interest in moving 
away from a narrow understanding of the requirement as a matter of 
prosecutorial policy – as the Simone Gbagbo case dramatically illustrates. 
 
Unless the SSC requirement is eliminated, in short, a state that wants to 
prosecute an ICC suspect for conduct unrelated to the OTP’s case will 
normally have only one option: to wait until the ICC proceedings conclude. 
That may be practically possible when the suspect is either acquitted by the 
ICC (such as Ngudjolo) or serves out his or her sentence (Katanga). But even 
then the state will be forced to wait for years before prosecuting: Ngudjolo 
was detained by the ICC for nearly five years before he was acquitted, and 
Katanga was in custody for nearly nine years before the ICC transferred him 
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to the DRC.122 A better example of how the SSC requirement reflects primacy 
instead of complementarity is difficult to imagine. 
 
 
 
 
D. Unwillingness 
 
In exploring the problems with the SSC requirement, this Article has assumed 
that the state challenging admissibility genuinely desires to bring a suspect 
to justice. That assumption is not unrealistic; it is impossible to argue that the 
mere act of investigating or prosecuting different conduct than the OTP 
indicates that the state is trying to shield the suspect from criminal 
responsibility. Lubanga’s case is a good example, given that the DRC intended 
to prosecute him for much more serious conduct than recruiting and using 
child soldiers. 
 
That said, in the absence of the SSC requirement, some states would almost 
certainly use a different-conduct investigation or prosecution as a pretext to 
avoid holding a suspect accountable for his or her crimes. Sudan’s decision to 
charge two intelligence officers suspected of involvement in a mass killing 
with looting instead of murder provides an instructive example.123 So there is 
no question that the Court would have to carefully scrutinise different-
conduct proceedings to ensure that the state is, in fact, genuinely 
investigating or prosecuting. 
 
But that is already the case. The ICC obviously cannot infer willingness from 
the mere fact that a national proceeding is based on the same conduct as the 
international proceeding; there are many ways to subvert an investigation or 
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prosecution that have nothing to do with the selection of conduct.124 
Moreover, given that states are free to charge international crimes as 
ordinary domestic crimes, the Court is already facing the need to develop a 
reliable heuristic for comparing the gravity of specific domestic crimes with 
their corresponding international counterparts. In some situations, such 
comparisons will be unproblematic – charging a suspect with murder instead 
of the war crime of murder, for example, obviously does not qualify as 
unwillingness. But other comparisons will be more difficult, such as where a 
state charges a suspect with voluntary manslaughter instead of the crime 
against humanity of murder or with sexual assault instead of the war crime 
of rape. 
 
There is no question that eliminating the SSC requirement would further 
complicate the ICC’s unwillingness inquiry. When a national proceeding is 
based on the same conduct as the international proceeding, the Court must 
only ensure that neither the charged crime nor the mechanics of the state’s 
investigation and prosecution indicate that the state is trying to shield the 
suspect from criminal responsibility. In the absence of the SSC requirement, 
the Court would have to scrutinise the state’s selection of conduct, as well.  t 
the ends of the willingness spectrum, that assessment would be no more 
problematic than the international crime/domestic crime assessment: a state 
that charged looting when the OTP charged the war crime of murder would 
be clearly unwilling to genuinely prosecute, while a state that charged rape 
when the OTP charged the war crime of recruiting child soldiers would be 
just as clearly willing. But there is no question that situations in the middle 
would be difficult for the Court to assess – such as the Dirty War and Arab 
Spring cases mentioned above, where states prosecuted economic 
misconduct instead of mass atrocities.  
 
Such added complexity would be a genuine cost of eliminating the SSC 
requirement, and it needs to be openly acknowledged. But the issue is one of 
degree, not of kind, given that states are not required to prosecute 
international-crimes as international crimes. If the ICC can compare an 
international crime to an ordinary domestic crime that is based on the same 
conduct, it can surely compare an international crime to an ordinary 
domestic crime that is based on different conduct. In both situations the 
question would be the same: does the state’s decision to deviate from the 
OTP’s case indicate that it is trying to shield the suspect from criminal 
responsibility, or does it simply reflect the state’s good-faith determination 
that prosecuting a different crime – whether based on the same or different 
conduct – will be more likely to end in conviction?  
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Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, the ICC could assess willingness in 
both situations by comparing the sentence the suspect would likely receive in 
the international proceeding to the sentence he or she would likely receive – 
or has already received – in the national proceeding.125 In my view, if the 
anticipated or actual national sentence would be equal to or longer than the 
anticipated international sentence (with some margin of appreciation), the 
Court could not credibly infer that the state was trying to shield the suspect 
from justice. And that would be true regardless of whether the ordinary 
domestic crime was based on the same or different conduct.126 Consider the 
same-conduct situation mentioned above: where a state charges a suspect 
with manslaughter instead of the war crime of murder. In the absence of 
process concerns, if voluntary manslaughter in that state normally results in 
a sentence of 30 years or more – the maximum sentence at the ICC in the 
absence of aggravating circumstances127 – that state could not credibly be 
considered unwilling to genuinely prosecute. Or consider a different-conduct 
situation such as Simone Gbagbo’s, where the national prosecution actually 
resulted in a sentence considerably longer than either of the sentences 
imposed by the ICC. Under the circumstances, and taking into account the 
sentencing practices of other international tribunals,128 it is difficult to 
conclude that the Ivorian prosecution was designed to shield Gbagbo from 
justice. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The ICC is struggling. After 13 years of life, it has convicted three defendants 
(Lubanga, Katanga, and Bemba), acquitted one (Ngudjolo), refused to confirm 
charges against four suspects (Abu Garda, Mbarushimana, Kosgey, and Ali), 
and temporarily postponed the confirmation hearing for a fifth because of 
lack of evidence (Laurent Gbagbo). The OTP has also had to dismiss charges 
against two defendants (Kenyatta and Muthaura) and suspend investigation 
into an entire situation (Sudan) because the targeted states refused to 
cooperate with it.129  
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It would be foolish to attribute primary responsibility for the ICC’s problems 
to the Court’s myopic approach to the principle of complementarity. But 
there is also no question that complementarity issues have played an 
important role in its struggles, as demonstrated by the contentious 
admissibility battles between the OTP and Kenya, Libya, and Côte d’Ivoire. 
Rightly or wrongly, far too many states have become convinced that the ICC 
is ‘an inwardly focused court whose primary concern is not the well-being of 
societies recovering from mass atrocities, but instead the maintenance of a 
docket that will maximise the Court’s own visibility and prestige’.130 
 
It is against the backdrop of these struggles that this Article defends radical 
complementarity – the idea that as long as a state is making a genuine effort 
to bring a suspect to justice, the ICC should find his or her case inadmissible 
regardless of the conduct the state investigates or the prosecutorial strategy 
the state pursues. For all of the reasons discussed in this Article, it is 
impossible to justify permitting the Court to pre-empt cases like Simone 
Gbagbo’s simply because the state has second-guessed the OTP’s selection of 
conduct. Indeed, although it is impossible to prove a counterfactual, it seems 
reasonable to assume that even the Kenyan government might have been 
more cooperative if the Court had bent over backwards (as it did in the 
Libyan situation) to avoid finding the Kenya cases admissible. 
 
The best solution to the ICC’s complementarity crisis is the one proposed in 
this  rticle: relaxing the ‘same person’ requirement to permit pyramidal (and 
similar) investigative strategies and eliminating the ‘substantially the same 
conduct’ requirement as a matter of law. The judges themselves could enact 
the first reform; as discussed earlier, the  ppeals Chamber’s ‘concrete and 
progressive investigative steps’ standard has no basis in the Rome Statute. 
But the second might require amending the Rome Statute, because the 
Statute at least arguably requires the ‘same conduct’ test,131 if not the 
‘substantially’ qualifier.  
 
 mending the Rome Statute is notoriously difficult. So if removing the ‘same 
conduct’ requirement is not possible, the Court should at least consider 
adopting one or more of the alternatives identified by scholars who are 
aware of the SSC requirement’s negative consequences. Judge Ušacka has 
recommended that the judges relax the requirement much more than the 
Appeals Chamber has already done; in her view, although there needs to be a 
‘nexus between the conduct being investigated and prosecuted domestically 
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and that before the Court, this “conduct” and any crimes investigated or 
prosecuted in relation thereto do not need to cover all of the same material 
and mental elements of the crimes before the Court and also does not need to 
include the same acts attributed to an individual under suspicion’.132 Stahn 
has proposed that the Court adopt greater ‘qualified deference’ to national 
proceedings, whether by giving a state more time to build a case between an 
admissibility challenge and the Court’s adjudication of that challenge or by 
adopting a ‘conditional admissibility’ regime in which the Court sets 
investigative and prosecutorial benchmarks for a state that has challenged 
admissibility and adjudicates the challenge only if the state fails to meet 
those benchmarks.133 And Robinson has proposed that the Assembly of 
States amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence to juridify the 
consultation and sequencing process, requiring the Court to prioritise a 
genuine national proceeding based on different conduct.134 
 
Any of these proposals would be a considerable improvement over the 
counterproductive status quo. But they still do not go far enough. The ICC 
will never function effectively – much less fulfill its lofty aspirations – until it 
has fundamentally reconsidered its relationship with national criminal-
justice systems. Put simply, the Court’s complementarity crisis calls for 
nothing less than radical complementarity.  
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